[WSIS CS-Plenary] Revised GFC draft - strategic aspects

[Bertrand de La Chapelle]

Dear Ralf, 
 Thanks for the analysis; strategic as ever. I cannot but smile in seeing 
you mention your sounding "too moderate" :-) I fully support your remarks. 
Some additional comments, that also respond to Parminder's remarks. 
 1) It is too early to consider the game lost. There are interesting aspects 
in the parts on implementation that could become really positive if they 
were more committing (like "should" instead of "could", or "may", etc...). 
In particular, if governments could "pledge to set up multi-stakeholder 
implementation frameworks at the national level" instead of being 
"encouraged" to do it, this could provide a very interesting tool for 
further action at the local level. Same for international organizations that 
"should" facilitate the formation of thematic multi-stakeholder initiatives 
and not only "could". These are only two elements; we will be able to 
discuss others further during the Prepcom. But this session is critical. 
 2) In the first phase, there was some ambiguity during the preparatory 
process : drafting was done as if the final documents were going to be 
signed by all actors, including civil society. We know what happened : in 
the end it was simply a declaration of governments, because thay wanted it 
and because civil society made an alternative declaration anyway. This time, 
there is no such ambiguity : the final Tunis Declaration will be a 
governmental declaration only . This has two consequences at least :
- in the text, governments can/should be forced to make explicit commitments 
binding each of them; in the first example above, the present formulation 
"we encourage governments" is extremely strange : they are the ones signing 
it; so if they think it is a good idea to set up national multi-stakeholder 
implementation frameworks, nothing is preventing them to do it on their own; 
there is no better space to do it. In fact it is their very responsibility 
and no government should be allowed to sign the Declaration without this 
personnal commitment. The present formulation would only be appropriate if 
civil society organizations were also signing the text. 
- there is a very simple "exit" strategy/threat : if the final document 
appears too weak in terms of commitment (just reiterating the Geneva 
Documents and saying : this should be implemented the way we always do it in 
the UN), it will be very easy to issue a public statement exposing it and 
denouncing the incredible waste of time and money of the last two years. As 
a matter of fact, Brazil has already used the argument on Sept 6 in the 
public GFC meeting, saying : "if we only say everybody should do it the way 
they have always done it, what was the purpose of the second phase ?" This 
is a very strong argument and one that could get press attention. CS does 
not need to walk away. Indeed, CS is the community willing to move forward 
with actors who do want to accomplish something and not see wasted the 
energy and time devoted to this process in the last four years. Some 
governments might want to join and set upt something more efficient as an 
outcome of this. 
 3) Tunis is all about implementation and the participation of 
non-governmental actors in it. It is unique. Traditional summits usually 
shelve declarations as soon as they are signed and governments wait five - 
sometimes ten - years before review summits take note that little progress 
has actually been made. Holding a second summit two years only after the 
first one has forced governments to face an issue they usually carafully 
avoid : the implementaion of decisions they have adopted.
 Of course, a great uncertainty remains on what follow-up mechanisms will be 
put in place - and even on whether there will be any such mechanism at all, 
given the strong objection of the United States. Nevertheless, all 
discussionsin the last two years (particularly in the context of the WGIG) 
point in the direction of a broader acceptance of a "multi-stakeholder" 
approach and the need to include civil society at all levels, national, 
regional and international. This is a progress and an opportunity to set a 
precedent in this respect. This has to be secured and the formulation "full 
and effective" (or any equivalent allowing governments to save face) is 
indeed a key point that should not be dropped. 
 4) Resolution 57/270 B will not be dropped, you are right. Still, I note 
that this resolution, beyond its incredibly contorted language, should not 
be interpreted the way it is by governments, as a limitation of the 
possibility to establish a real follow-up and implementation framework : 
- its very origin comes from the fact that (quote) : "after a decade of such 
events (ie summits), progress in implementation has been insufficient and 
therefore the time has come to vigorously pursue effective implementation"; 
in other words, one reason for this resolution is the fact that governments 
do not live up to their commitments : do they really want to insist on that 
? 
- 57/270 is also directed at the organizations of the UN system, to make 
sure they all take into account the outcomes of various summits, instead of 
letting their recommendations sleep in a drawer as usual; this resolution 
therefore sets a minimum, not a maximum; how could anybody want to prevent 
establishing even more efficient mechanisms ?
- for that very reason, it cannot be regarded as preventing any summit to 
put in place more detailed follow-up mechanisms of its own; in fact, the 
very beggining of resolution 57/270 (in its paragraph4) precisely mentions 
the need to remind governments of their obligation to "fulfill their 
commitments regarding the means of implementation contained in the relevant 
paragraphs of the outcomes documents of [each summit]" and even explicitly 
mentions the "Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on sustainable 
Development (Johannesburg)"
 5) Finally, in terms of strategy, CS actors present in Geneva next week 
should remember that there is little time, that there are only two issues on 
the table (IG and follow-up). Both are about process and this PrepCom is all 
about drafting : issues outside the scope of those two themes (substantive 
or related to the Tunis Summit itself) should be handled in parallel with 
the negociation process to allow the best use of this limited time. 
 There are other points in your paper that I wanted to address but this is 
enough for the moment I suppose :-)
 Looking forward to seeing you in Geneva. 
 Best
 Bertrand

     

 On 9/17/05, Ralf Bendrath <bendrath at zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote: 
> 
> [Please note that by using 'REPLY', your response goes to the entire list. 
> Kindly use individual addresses for responses intended for specific people]
> 
> Click http://wsis.funredes.org/plenary/ to access automatic translation of 
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> _______________________________________
> 
> Thanks for the compliation, Bertrand - really helpful.
> 
> BTW: The latest drafts of the Political Chapeau and the Operation Part are
> now online as annexes to the report on the work of the GFC:
> <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1867|0>
> 
> I want to provide some comments on Parminder's comments, and an attempt to
> look at the big picture (especially on creating a new forum vs. the UNGA
> 57/270 ECOSOC approach) below. I hope it is somehow understandable, I am
> already getting lost in all the dfferent draft versions...
> 
> Parminder wrote:
> 
> > So, instead of heeding opposition to the original changes proposed by
> > the chair, the draft document is only going from bad to worse.
> I am not totally convinced of this, at least if we look at the
> international / UN level.
> 
> my formatting in ASCII below:
> <new language>
> <--deleted language-->
> 
> If you look at the new para 12:
> "At the national level, based on the WSIS outcomes, we encourage
> governments to set up a national implementation framework with <--full and
> effective participation--> of civil society and business entities;
> 
> Roughly the same for new para 13c:
> "We consider a multi-stakeholder approach and the <--full and effective-->
> participation in regional WSIS implementation activities by civil society
> and business entities to be essential."
> 
> This is bad, and we seriuosly have to fight this. We have to insist that
> 
> I support Bertrand's suggestions at the GFC meeting on 6 September
> (from Renata's report: § 10: "We <--acknowledge--> >affirm> that
> multi-stakeholder participation"; § 12: We <--encourage-> <pledge>
> governments to set up; have the possibility should support...).
> 
> But we at the moment should ask to go back to the original language:
> §10: "continuous and substantial involvement" instead of "participation".
> 
> But then you also have:
> 
> new para 14c:
> "The modalities of coordination of implementation activities among the UN
> agencies should be defined by the UN Secretary General on the basis of
> existing practices within the UN system <--[-->and within the WSIS<--]-->.
> The experience of, and the activities undertaken by, UN agencies in the
> WSIS process—notably ITU, UNESCO and UNDP—should continue to be used to
> their fullest extent."
> 
> The square brackets are gone now! They used to be around "and within
> the WSIS" (referring to "based on existing practices within the UN 
> System").
> 
> and new para 35 (though still in brackets):
> "<Participation> <--Continuous involvement--> of all stakeholders in the
> policy discussion after Tunis Summit is essential and the modalities of
> such participation should be established."
> 
> At least, "participation" is better than "involvement", or am I getting
> this wrong? We should of course ask for "full and effective" to be added.
> 
> Then, you also have another reference to UNGA 57/270.
> 
> So: The way I see it after having a long discussion with Chantal last
> night (and I know I am a natural born optimist):
> 
> It seems like Karklins is trying to react to demands from several
> governments to have less mandatory inclusion of observers on the national
> and regional level, whcih is where implementation has to take place. This
> really is bad for us, but looking at the opposition from Brazil, China and
> other towards the MSP and from the US on the follow-up at all,
> understandable from Karklin's perspective.
> The problem is: Those fights have to made in the respective countries and
> regions anyway, we can't really decide this in Geneva and then think
> everything will be fine. (Of course, we still have to fight like hell that
> "full and effective" stays in.)
> 
> But in return, the follow-up on the policy level (which is different than
> implementation) will now be "on the basis of existing practices within the
> UN system and within the WSIS". This is better for us than the previous
> draft, where the WSIS reference was in brackets.
> 
> In addition, the references to UNGA 57/270 won't go out anymore, I am
> pretty sure. So, what we could push for instead of a new forum is to
> mainstream the existing MSP practices from the WSIS into ECOSOC etc. There
> are a number of references in the report following 57/270 we can use for
> that (the report is available in html at
> <http://www.wsis-si.org/DOCS/updated-report-13may05-N0534415.pdf>).
> 
> From Chapter VII:
> "In recent years, the Economic and Social Council and its functional
> commissions have significantly intensified the involvement of civil
> society, including non-governmental organizations, foundations,
> parliamentarians and local authorities, and the private sector. Perhaps
> the most innovative and successful of the Council's multi-stakeholder
> initiatives is the Information and Communication Technology Task Force."
> 
> (Well, given the weak standing of the UN ICT TF, I know this is not much.
> But we can always refer to the really open discussions and the
> participation of CS representatives as real peers. I know in reality it
> was a bit different, but officially...).
> 
> In any case, under the current draft, the decision about the follow-up /
> implementation structure will be made by Kofi Annan. I saw his press
> conference in NYC a few days ago on TV, and he spoke quite nicely about
> the importance of involving civil society better and more effective in the
> UN system.
> 
> Looking at the big picture: ECOSOC is not the greatest place for us, but I
> am not really convinced that it would be better to add new specialized
> forums here and there to the standards UN framework. That was the whole
> idea of 57/270, and somehow it makes sense to me: Why should we push for a
> new playground that is disconnected from the core of the UN, when instead
> we have a slight chance to use the WSIS experience for a more meaningful
> (and strategically more relevant) opening up of the core UN framework? Of
> course, for this you need much more patience and other allies. But if
> anything in this direction can be placed in the Operational Part in the
> end, it is a clear sign that we have some allies among the governments on
> this. If not, we are lost in either case.
> 
> In a way, it is a great chance that the WSIS is the first summit do decide
> about its follow-up according to the 57/270 report's recommendations. It
> would be much worse if it had been a summit on security policy or the 
> like.
> 
> So, given the fact that none among the governments is enthusiastic about
> creating a new forum and dropping the 57/270 references, we should instead
> insist on "full and effective and meaningful and whatever" participation
> of CS in the ECOSOC-guided follow-up.
> 
> I totally agree with Parminder on the tactical level:
> 
> > In the circumstances, if the early few days at prepcom 3 show us that
> > the new implementation text is going to go through, there isn't really
> > much left for CS to associate with this process any further (except for
> > IG issues) .
> >
> > CS may want to take a decision at this stage on whether it wants to
> > stay in or opt out of the negotiations around the implementation issue.
> > The first task that faces the CS representatives who will attend
> > prepcom 3 from Monday onwards is to develop a clear CS strategy on this
> > issue.
> >
> > Taking a hard stance at this point on this issue, and lobbying with
> > some more sympathetic government delegations on it, may still be the
> > only chance even if we are seeking a minimal outcome on some
> > implementation mechanisms, and some real global policy spaces
> > post-WSIS.
> 
> I may sound too moderate in what I wrote above, but those of you who
> remember that I facilitated the ad-hoc strategy working group in the first
> phase that led to exactly the decision for CS to drop out of the official
> drafting circus will know it is not the case. I am only trying to explore
> at the moment which avenues are worth exploring and which ones are just a
> waste of energy for us.
> 
> We also should discuss how to use our small threat (the "exit" option) in
> the most effective way. This option is normally most effective when you
> just threaten to use it. Once you exit, you don't have any impact anymore.
> But of course, we must have a clear understanding of what would be
> acceptable for us at all and where the line towards unacceptable is.
> 
> Best, Ralf
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