[WSIS CS-Plenary] Revised GFC draft - strategic aspects

[Parminder]

Dear Ralf and Bertrand,

 

 Thanks Ralf, for putting forward the different options we have in front  of
us, and putting it together in a strategic framework – of what is best to
work on, and achievable. 

 

I have a few comments which only build on what have is being discussed here,
and may be considered in addition to them.

 

First, I will clarify that I did not say that all is lost, neither that CS
SHOULD walk away. But I insist that a lot is certainly being lost -and I
don’t agree with Ralf’s assertion that this may not be so – and that just a
57/270 linked follow up can be as good or even better. I only mean that that
the first few days at the prepcom are crucial and the CS must be very
pro-active, conscious that much may be getting lost. 

 

On ‘specific follow up’ versus ‘57/270’ Bertrand has anticipated much of my
response. 57/270 is an add-on and an internal rule-making for UN
functioning. In that sense it is the very minimum and not a maximum.  Every
summit is allowed to put in its own follow-up mechanism and these can then
be coordinated in the 57/270 framework with other follow-ups etc. 

 

So, in this context we need to see some special characteristics of WSIS –
which doesn’t necessarily make it more important than other summits but
certainly different – I have discussed these issues a few times earlier –
about issues being cross-cutting, they being evolving, they often being
paradigm redefining whereby existing mandates of UN agencies can be limiting
and used by vested interests to block-out policy discussions on emergent IS
policy issues. For all these reasons, WSIS needs more specific and more
multi-pronged follow-up mechanisms. And that was also the logic of the
original draft. 

 

The specificity of the needed follow-ups for WSIS need not be limited by
57/270. And what would be the political mandate and direction given at WSIS
is not of the same order as the sanitized bureaucratic implementation, ‘as
per existing rules’. 57/270 is in any case there, and to re-affirm it at the
summit doesn’t add much. And if that is being done then as Brazil stated at
the GFC meeting – this Tunis phase was really not needed. 

 

On Ralf’s poser -- >> Why should we push for a
new playground that is disconnected from the core of the UN>>

 

We really are not looking for any forum disconnected form the core of the
UN. Any follow-up mechanism will still be embedded in the core of the UN. I
mean, if ITU alternative is what is alluded to by Ralf, I will like to say
that I was never for a ITU led follow-up, I am fine with follow-up in ECOSOC
framework – even ICT TF is in that framework – but that doesn’t stop world
leaders to give political direction on setting up specific follow up
structures. And give clear direction to UN agencies to get the WSIS
implementation/ follow up integrated into their activities, rather than
merely say, they ‘could’ do it. 

 

So whatever virtues Ralf mentions about using the WSIS follow up to
generally improve UN spaces from CS point of view are still available even
if we go for more well specified follow-up structures.  

 

I think we should be clear that while getting the MSP philosophy more and
more into global policy spaces is important, this is just one of the
imperatives we fight for. There is the other issue of keeping up effective
global policy engagements on IS issues among all actors and ensuring
effective implementation/ follow-up. And the attempt by US and others to
minimize political commitment to opening such new spaces is a very political
act that requires a political response

..

 

I am laboring these points only to insist that in pursuance of a strategy we
may not lose the sight of the ‘truth’. Lets be clear on the truth, and still
follow the best strategy for gaining whatever can be gained through the
process. 

 

So 57/270 can stay and we should still fight for as much clarity on what
exactly the follow-up mechanism will be – I am even ready to settle for a
reformed ICT TF like structure in ECOSOC framework with clearer political
mandate than just being like all other follow-ups. So we need to fight for
as much as we can gain on this count. Getting a clear political mandate from
the summit is always better than, for example trusting Annan to do the best.
I think he is a good man but I am unwilling to leave things to that
.

 

And when we speak about also being ready with an possible ‘exit’ option we
should remember that points ‘11’  and ‘35’ are still not agreed to by the US
and remain bracketed. US wants complete removal of any mention of follow-up
etc in any real way. This may be its strategy to take an extreme position
and then give a few crumbs of concession – but CS need not begin to accept
the diluting of the follow-up as something logical and acceptable. We may
have to negotiate and not get what we want, but to begin to ‘understand’ the
other position, while it helps to develop ours, too much of it can even
weaken our negotiating strength. 

 

And Ralf, I assure you, it is a long way before anyone starts to think you
have softened too much and become a moderate :-). Your reputation remains
unsullied. Look forward to seeing you in Geneva.

 

Best regards

 

Parminder 

_________________________________________________

Parminder Jeet Singh

IT for Change

Bridging Development Realities and Technological Possibilities 

91-80-26654134

 <http://www.ITforChange.net> www.ITforChange.net 

  _____  

From: plenary-admin at wsis-cs.org [mailto:plenary-admin at wsis-cs.org] On Behalf
Of Bertrand de La Chapelle
Sent: Sunday, September 18, 2005 12:22 AM
To: plenary at wsis-cs.org
Subject: Re: [WSIS CS-Plenary] Revised GFC draft - strategic aspects

 

Dear Ralf, 

 

Thanks for the analysis; strategic as ever. I cannot but smile in seeing you
mention your sounding "too moderate" :-) I fully support your remarks. Some
additional comments, that also respond to Parminder's remarks.   

 

1) It is too early to consider the game lost. There are interesting aspects
in the parts on implementation that could become really positive if they
were more committing (like "should" instead of "could",  or "may", etc...).
In particular, if governments could "pledge to set up multi-stakeholder
implementation frameworks at the national level" instead of being
"encouraged" to do it, this could provide a very interesting tool for
further action at the local level. Same for international organizations that
"should" facilitate the formation of thematic multi-stakeholder initiatives
and not only "could". These are only two elements; we will be able to
discuss others further during the Prepcom. But this session is critical. 

 

2) In the first phase, there was some ambiguity during the preparatory
process : drafting was done as if the final documents were going to be
signed by all actors, including civil society. We know what happened : in
the end it was simply a declaration of governments, because thay wanted it
and because civil society made an alternative declaration anyway. This time,
there is no such ambiguity : the final Tunis Declaration will be a
governmental declaration only . This has two consequences at least : 

- in the text, governments can/should be forced to make explicit commitments
binding each of them; in the first example above, the present formulation
"we encourage governments" is extremely strange : they are the ones signing
it; so if they think it is a good idea to set up national multi-stakeholder
implementation frameworks, nothing is preventing them to do it on their own;
there is no better space to do it. In fact it is their very responsibility
and no government should be allowed to sign the Declaration without this
personnal commitment. The present formulation would only be appropriate if
civil society organizations were also signing the text.  

- there is a very simple  "exit" strategy/threat : if the final document
appears too weak in terms of commitment (just reiterating the Geneva
Documents and saying : this should be implemented the way we always do it in
the UN), it will be very easy to issue a public statement exposing it and
denouncing the incredible waste of time and money of the last two years. As
a matter of fact, Brazil has already used the argument on Sept 6 in the
public GFC meeting, saying : "if we only say everybody should do it the way
they have always done it, what was the purpose of the second phase ?" This
is a very strong argument and one that could get press attention. CS does
not need to walk away. Indeed, CS is the community willing to move forward
with actors who do want to accomplish something and not see wasted the
energy and time devoted to this process in the last four years. Some
governments might want to join and set upt something more efficient as an
outcome of this. 

 

3) Tunis is all about implementation and the participation of
non-governmental actors in it. It is unique. Traditional summits usually
shelve declarations as soon as they are signed and governments wait five -
sometimes ten - years before review summits take note that little progress
has actually been made. Holding a second summit two years only after the
first one has forced governments to face an issue they usually carafully
avoid : the implementaion of decisions they have adopted. 

 

Of course, a great uncertainty remains on what follow-up mechanisms will be
put in place - and even on whether there will be any such mechanism at all,
given the strong objection of the United States. Nevertheless, all
discussionsin the last two years (particularly in the context of the WGIG)
point in the direction of a broader acceptance of a "multi-stakeholder"
approach and the need to include civil society at all levels, national,
regional and international. This is a progress and an opportunity to set a
precedent in this respect. This has to be secured and the formulation "full
and effective" (or any equivalent allowing governments to save face) is
indeed a key point that should not be dropped. 

 

4) Resolution 57/270 B will not be dropped, you are right. Still, I note
that this resolution, beyond its incredibly contorted language, should not
be interpreted the way it is by governments, as a limitation of the
possibility to establish a real follow-up and implementation framework : 

- its very origin comes from the fact that (quote) : "after a decade of such
events (ie summits), progress in implementation has been insufficient and
therefore the time has come to vigorously pursue effective implementation";
in other words, one reason for this resolution is the fact that governments
do not live up to their commitments : do they really want to insist on that
? 

- 57/270 is also directed at the organizations of the UN system, to make
sure they all take into account the outcomes of various summits, instead of
letting their recommendations sleep in a drawer as usual; this resolution
therefore sets a minimum, not a maximum; how could anybody want to prevent
establishing even more efficient mechanisms ? 

- for that very reason, it cannot be regarded as preventing any summit to
put in place more detailed follow-up mechanisms of its own; in fact, the
very beggining of resolution 57/270 (in its paragraph4) precisely mentions
the need to remind governments of their obligation to "fulfill their
commitments regarding the means of implementation contained in the relevant
paragraphs of the outcomes documents of [each summit]" and even explicitly
mentions the "Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on sustainable
Development (Johannesburg)" 

 

5) Finally, in terms of strategy, CS actors present in Geneva next week
should remember that there is little time, that there are only two issues on
the table (IG and follow-up). Both are about process and this PrepCom is all
about drafting : issues outside the scope of those two themes (substantive
or related to the Tunis Summit itself) should be handled in parallel with
the negociation process to allow the best use of this limited time.   

 

There are other points in your paper that I wanted to address but this is
enough for the moment I suppose :-)

 

Looking forward to seeing you in Geneva. 

 

Best

 

Bertrand

 

 

 

 

 



 

On 9/17/05, Ralf Bendrath <bendrath at zedat.fu-berlin.de> wrote: 

[Please note that by using 'REPLY', your response goes to the entire list.
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_______________________________________

Thanks for the compliation, Bertrand - really helpful. 

BTW: The latest drafts of the Political Chapeau and the Operation Part are
now online as annexes to the report on the work of the GFC:
< <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1867|0>
http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1867|0>

I want to provide some comments on Parminder's comments, and an attempt to
look at the big picture (especially on creating a new forum vs. the UNGA 
57/270 ECOSOC approach) below. I hope it is somehow understandable, I am
already getting lost in all the dfferent draft versions...

Parminder wrote:

> So, instead of heeding opposition to the original changes proposed by 
> the chair, the draft document is only going from bad to worse.
I am not totally convinced of this, at least if we look at the
international / UN level.

my formatting in ASCII below:
  <new language> 
  <--deleted language-->

If you look at the new para 12:
"At the national level, based on the WSIS outcomes, we encourage
governments to set up a national implementation framework with <--full and 
effective participation--> of civil society and business entities;

Roughly the same for new para 13c:
"We consider a multi-stakeholder approach and the <--full and effective-->
participation in regional WSIS implementation activities by civil society 
and business entities to be essential."

This is bad, and we seriuosly have to fight this. We have to insist that

I support Bertrand's suggestions at the GFC meeting on 6 September
(from Renata's report: § 10: "We <--acknowledge--> >affirm> that 
multi-stakeholder participation"; § 12: We <--encourage-> <pledge>
governments to set up; have the possibility should support...).

But we at the moment should ask to go back to the original language: 
§10: "continuous and substantial involvement" instead of "participation".

But then you also have:

new para 14c:
"The modalities of coordination of implementation activities among the UN
agencies should be defined by the UN Secretary General on the basis of 
existing practices within the UN system <--[-->and within the WSIS<--]-->.
The experience of, and the activities undertaken by, UN agencies in the
WSIS process—notably ITU, UNESCO and UNDP—should continue to be used to 
their fullest extent."

The square brackets are gone now! They used to be around "and within
the WSIS" (referring to "based on existing practices within the UN System").

and new para 35 (though still in brackets): 
"<Participation> <--Continuous involvement--> of all stakeholders in the
policy discussion after Tunis Summit is essential and the modalities of
such participation should be established."

At least, "participation" is better than "involvement", or am I getting
this wrong? We should of course ask for "full and effective" to be added.

Then, you also have another reference to UNGA 57/270. 

So: The way I see it after having a long discussion with Chantal last
night (and I know I am a natural born optimist):

It seems like Karklins is trying to react to demands from several
governments to have less mandatory inclusion of observers on the national 
and regional level, whcih is where implementation has to take place. This
really is bad for us, but looking at the opposition from Brazil, China and
other towards the MSP and from the US on the follow-up at all, 
understandable from Karklin's perspective.
The problem is: Those fights have to made in the respective countries and
regions anyway, we can't really decide this in Geneva and then think
everything will be fine. (Of course, we still have to fight like hell that 
"full and effective" stays in.)

But in return, the follow-up on the policy level (which is different than
implementation) will now be "on the basis of existing practices within the
UN system and within the WSIS". This is better for us than the previous 
draft, where the WSIS reference was in brackets.

In addition, the references to UNGA 57/270 won't go out anymore, I am
pretty sure. So, what we could push for instead of a new forum is to
mainstream the existing MSP practices from the WSIS into ECOSOC etc. There 
are a number of references in the report following 57/270 we can use for
that (the report is available in html at
<http://www.wsis-si.org/DOCS/updated-report-13may05-N0534415.pdf >).

>From Chapter VII:
"In recent years, the Economic and Social Council and its functional
commissions have significantly intensified the involvement of civil
society, including non-governmental organizations, foundations, 
parliamentarians and local authorities, and the private sector. Perhaps
the most innovative and successful of the Council's multi-stakeholder
initiatives is the Information and Communication Technology Task Force." 

(Well, given the weak standing of the UN ICT TF, I know this is not much.
But we can always refer to the really open discussions and the
participation of CS representatives as real peers. I know in reality it 
was a bit different, but officially...).

In any case, under the current draft, the decision about the follow-up /
implementation structure will be made by Kofi Annan. I saw his press
conference in NYC a few days ago on TV, and he spoke quite nicely about 
the importance of involving civil society better and more effective in the
UN system.

Looking at the big picture: ECOSOC is not the greatest place for us, but I
am not really convinced that it would be better to add new specialized 
forums here and there to the standards UN framework. That was the whole
idea of 57/270, and somehow it makes sense to me: Why should we push for a
new playground that is disconnected from the core of the UN, when instead 
we have a slight chance to use the WSIS experience for a more meaningful
(and strategically more relevant) opening up of the core UN framework? Of
course, for this you need much more patience and other allies. But if 
anything in this direction can be placed in the Operational Part in the
end, it is a clear sign that we have some allies among the governments on
this. If not, we are lost in either case.

In a way, it is a great chance that the WSIS is the first summit do decide 
about its follow-up according to the 57/270 report's recommendations. It
would be much worse if it had been a summit on security policy or the like.

So, given the fact that none among the governments is enthusiastic about 
creating a new forum and dropping the 57/270 references, we should instead
insist on "full and effective and meaningful and whatever" participation
of CS in the ECOSOC-guided follow-up.

I totally agree with Parminder on the tactical level: 

> In the circumstances, if the early few days at prepcom 3 show us that
> the new implementation text is going to go through, there isn't really
> much left for CS to associate with this process any further (except for 
> IG issues) .
>
> CS may want to take a decision at this stage on whether it wants to
> stay in or opt out of the negotiations around the implementation issue.
> The first task that faces the CS representatives who will attend 
> prepcom 3 from Monday onwards is to develop a clear CS strategy on this
> issue.
>
> Taking a hard stance at this point on this issue, and lobbying with
> some more sympathetic government delegations on it, may still be the 
> only chance even if we are seeking a minimal outcome on some
> implementation mechanisms, and some real global policy spaces
> post-WSIS.

I may sound too moderate in what I wrote above, but those of you who 
remember that I facilitated the ad-hoc strategy working group in the first
phase that led to exactly the decision for CS to drop out of the official
drafting circus will know it is not the case. I am only trying to explore 
at the moment which avenues are worth exploring and which ones are just a
waste of energy for us.

We also should discuss how to use our small threat (the "exit" option) in
the most effective way. This option is normally most effective when you 
just threaten to use it. Once you exit, you don't have any impact anymore.
But of course, we must have a clear understanding of what would be
acceptable for us at all and where the line towards unacceptable is.

Best, Ralf
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