[WSIS CS-Plenary] Assessment of WSIS Outcomes for Internet Governance

[Hans Klein]

This analysis is currently available at www.IP3.gatech.edu .

It should soon be available at www.InternetGovernance.org


November 23, 2005

An Assessment of the WSIS-2/Tunis ‘05 Outcomes

The outcomes of the Tunis World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
are significant -- and rather surprising.  ICANN emerges from the summit 
both unchanged and significantly different.  After WSIS it has a stronger 
claim to legitimacy.

ICANN emerged unchanged, in that its institutional structures – most 
notably its mechanisms for political oversight – were not amended.  ICANN 
continues to operate under the formal authority of a single government, the 
US.  Such a unilateral globalization model is a novel arrangement, quite 
unlike what is used in other global sectors (e.g. telephony or 
communication  satellites.)  The US continues to exercise a kind of 
unipolar authority it does not have in physical space.

But ICANN also emerges from WSIS radically different: it is now endowed 
with a greater degree of legitimacy.  Over a period of four years the UN 
family of nations intensely scrutinized ICANN, Internet governance, and 
unilateral US oversight, and they came to a decision: they declined to 
change ICANN’s structures.  Whereas US control was previously the product 
of a unilateral assertion, it is now the outcome of a lengthy process of 
scrutiny by all nations.

Thus ICANN’s greatest weakeness – its lack of legitimacy and its related 
lack of support from governments around the world – is less after 
WSIS.  From now on, governments that criticize ICANN are criticizing an 
arrangement that they themselves reviewed and left unchanged.

The WSIS decision cannot really be called an endorsement of ICANN.  The 
text nowhere mentions ICANN by name, and there is no real declaration of 
support.  Still, the UN has decided not to act against the organization, 
and this collective inaction is the final word after years of debate.

The Internet Governance Forum
Another important WSIS outcome is the launch of the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF).  Two features characterize the IGF.  First, it is a 
multi-stakeholder forum.  Although a creation of the UN, the forum 
membership will include more than just UN member states; participating 
equally will be entities from the private sector and from civil 
society.  Second, the forum has no concrete power.  It is an advisory 
body.  Its member will discuss and formulate collective recommendations, 
but those recommendations will not carry the weight of policy.

Still, the forum could become powerful.  A forum is a prerequisite for 
collective action at the global level, making possible communication, 
interest aggregation, bargaining, and decision.  WSIS was itself a forum, 
and it made possible certain collective decisions of great political 
import.  (For more on the functionality of forums see the article 
“Understanding WSIS” in the journal Information Technology and 
International Development.)  If the new forum makes continued collective 
decision-making possible, it could be a powerful entity.  Its 
recommendations could be formalized by national governments.

Still one might ask, what is new about this forum?  ICANN already has 
advisory committees for governments and for civil society members, and the 
private sector controls its board outright.  Why create another mechanism 
for formulating advice? The answer is that this new forum will primarily 
have a policy focus.  Whereas ICANN’s bodies ostensibly focus on technical 
coordination, the IGF will focus on all issues of Internet governance.

This dual arrangement formalizes the questionable division of Internet 
governance into two domains: ICANN’s domain of technical coordination and 
the IGF’s domain of public policy.  It risks validating the inaccurate 
claim that ICANN is a purely technical body without policy-making content.

Implications: ICANN and IGF
In an earlier analysis entitled “ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of 
Law” I argued that ICANN needed a legislative mandate.  It now has some of 
that. The Tunis documents are a major step in that direction.

The locus of policy making will now shift.  Fundamental disputes about 
ICANN’s structures of policy-making have been settled (at least for 
now.)  The next step is to work within those structures.

WSIS defined two forums for policy making: ICANN, for matters of technical 
coordination, and the IGF, for everything else.  In the short term, most 
Internet governance activity will switch to ICANN, where debates will occur 
within the ICANN structures.  They will focus more on substantive issues 
relating to technical coordination.

Of particular note is ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC).  The 
GAC is the forum where governments have the opportunity to look in on ICANN 
decision-making and offer their advice.  It will likely become a much more 
important body – perhaps the most important body – in ICANN.  At WSIS 
governments made it clear that they want a greater voice in ICANN 
decisions, and the GAC will be the vehicle for that.  Thanks to WSIS 
governments now know a lot more about ICANN issues, so their participation 
should be more informed and effective.

Civil society does not have a strong base within ICANN.  The Non-Commercial 
Users Constituency (NCUC) operates at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the multiple 
commercial constituencies.  Even weaker is ICANN’s At Large Advisory 
Committee (ALAC), which is a pale shadow of the earlier user representation 
on the board.  Ever since business and technical interests eliminated 
elections, civil society participation has been constrained.  Outside of 
ICANN, the Internet Society (ISOC) is not a reliable home for civil 
society.  Since 2002 business interests control ISOC by virtue of having 
rewritten its bylaws in a manner similar to ICANN.  ISOC, however, still 
claims to be a civil society organization.  What user organizations are in 
ALAC are mostly sub-units of ISOC.  In summary, the situation for civil 
society in the post-WSIS ICANN is a major source of concern.

A top priority for civil society should be reforming ALAC. With ICANN 
confirmed as the one operational institution for global Internet 
governance, civil society should develop a more effective voice 
there.  Investing in ALAC and NCUC is one way to achieve that.

The second forum emerging from WSIS is the Internet Governance Forum.  The 
IGF can be thought of as a continuation of the WSIS, since it provides a 
place for multistakeholder discussion of a very large number of 
issues.  The key question here is whether governments embrace it.  With GAC 
already established and offering a rich agenda, some governments may 
question the utility of a second advisory forum.  Industry interests are 
likely to be cool to the IGF, since they have so much more influence in 
ICANN.  Civil society, with its weak base in ICANN, may have the most at 
stake in the IGF, but they may not be able to make it succeed without the 
commitment of those other stakeholders.


Conclusion
Before WSIS ICANN was a sort of Frankenstein organization created in the 
basement of the US Department of Commerce.  No formal delegation of 
authority from the US Congress authorized its exercise of public 
powers.  Nor did its global elections give it legitimacy, since they were 
canceled before full implementation.

Now ICANN can claim some degree of public authority.  Many people may 
regret the UN’s implicit endorsement of ICANN, but no one can easily 
dismiss the validity of the process.  ICANN is the same but different.  The 
next step in the policy process will be to work within its structures.

There is one additional possibility, not mentioned above, that looms over 
Internet governance: technology re-design.  With WSIS leaving ICANN in 
place, those dissatisfied with ICANN are likely to move away from a 
political strategy.   Instead, they may see more promise in trying to 
eliminate the single root.  One example in this trend is the Open Root 
Server Network (orsn.org), which is creating a parallel network of servers 
that are autonomous of ICANN.  With such innovations in place, the power in 
controlling the authoritative root server is reduced. In the near future, 
it will be interesting to see how many groups propose technical innovations 
that effectively decentralize the root.

References
WSIS Decision: “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” 15 November 
2005, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E

“Understanding WSIS: An Institutional Analysis of the World Summit on the 
Information Society,” Information Technology and International Development, 
published by MIT Press, 2005.

“ICANN Reform: Establishing the Rule of Law,” web published analysis.

Articles can be found at www.InternetGovernance.org and www.IP3.gatech.edu.


Author is Hans Klein, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Georgia 
Institute of Technology and Partner in the Internet Governance 
Project.  The paper benefited from comments by Milton Mueller.

###
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://mailman-new.greennet.org.uk/pipermail/plenary/attachments/20051124/e0586514/attachment.html